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Abstract 
In the comparative political economy of rich democracies there is a long tradition of 
classifying countries into one of a small number of categories based on their economic 
institutions and policies. The most recent of these is the Varieties of Capitalism project, 
which posits two major clusters of nations: coordinated and liberal market economies. 
This classification has generated controversy. We leverage recent advances in mixture 
model-based clustering to see what the data say on the matter. We find that there is 
considerable uncertainty around the number of clusters and, barring a few cases, which 
country should be placed in which cluster. Moreover, when viewed over time, both the 
number of clusters and country membership change considerably. As a result, argu-
ments about who has the “right” typology are misplaced. We urge caution in using 
these country classifications in structuring qualitative inquiry and discourage their us-
age as indicator variables in quantitative analysis, especially in the context of time-series 
cross-section data. We argue that the real value of both Esping-Andersen’s work and the 
Varieties of Capitalism project consists of their theoretical contributions and heuristic 
classification of ideal types.
Zusammenfassung
In der vergleichenden Politischen Ökonomie reicher Demokratien gibt es eine lange Tra-
dition, Länder aufgrund ihrer unterschiedlichen wirtschaftlichen Institutionen und Po-
licies zu typologisieren. Die jüngste dieser Typologien – das „Varieties-of-Capitalism“-
Konzept – erfasst zwei Gruppen von Ländern: koordinierte und liberale Marktwirt-
schaften. Da diese Klassifizierung einige Kontroversen hervorgerufen hat, nutzen die 
Autoren neueste Fortschritte im „mixture model-based clustering“, um zu prüfen, wel-
che Erkenntnisse die Daten zu diesem Problem liefern. Die Ergebnisse weisen eine be-
trächtliche Unsicherheit hinsichtlich der Anzahl der Cluster und, mit wenigen Ausnah-
men, der Zuordnung der Länder zu Clustern auf. Betrachtet man größere Zeiträume, 
variieren darüber hinaus die Anzahl der Cluster und Ländermitgliedschaften erheblich. 
Als Folge dieser Befunde halten die Autoren Argumentationen über die „richtige“ Ty-
pologisierung für unangebracht und raten davon ab, diese Länderklassifizierungen zur 
Strukturierung qualitativer Studien heranzuziehen oder als Indikatorvariablen in quan-
titativen Analysen zu nutzen. Dies gilt insbesondere im Kontext von gepoolten Zeitrei-
hen- und Querschnittsdaten. Sie argumentieren, dass der substanzielle Wert sowohl der 
Forschung von Esping-Andersen als auch des „Varieties-of-Capitalism“-Ansatzes in den 
Beiträgen zur Theorie und den heuristischen Klassifizierungen von Idealtypen besteht.
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Introduction
The remarkable variation in both political-economic institutions and outcomes across 
industrial democracies has provided fodder for political economists for at least a half 
century. To make sense of this variation, a long and distinguished tradition emerged 
of classifying countries into one of a small number of categories. Among the most in-
fluential works is Esping-Andersen’s (1990), which sorts rich democracies into “three 
worlds” labeled Liberal, Conservative, and Social Democratic. The “varieties of capital-
ism” project (Hall/Soskice 2001), henceforth VoC, builds on the “three worlds” approach 
by incorporating insights from the new institutional economics, but shifts emphasis to 
the role of the firm. The VoC literature argues that these same twenty-odd countries can 
be assigned the labels of either “liberal market economy” (LME) or “coordinated mar-
ket economy” (CME). This dichotomy is so intuitively compelling that it has begun to 
structure empirical research, both quantitative and qualitative. On the quantitative side, 
indicator variables representing whether a particular country is an LME have appeared 
as regressors (Ringe 2006; Rueda/Pontusson 2000; Taylor 2006), sometimes in an ef-
fort to explain a variable that others have cited as determining the initial classification 
(Hamann/Kelly 2009). On the qualitative side, the VoC logic has been used to justify 
case selection as well as the dimensions for comparative case study (Campbell/Pedersen 
2007; Culpepper 2007; Thatcher 2004).
To date, this exercise in classification has been the result of rankings on additive indices 
and expert judgments along a large number of dimensions. Unsurprisingly, the cluster-
ing of countries has generated a fair degree of controversy. Are there only two varieties 
of capitalism? Where should we put Portugal? Are these categories immutable, at least 
over the period from 1980 to the present? Indeed, Thelen (2004: 2) states that “all these 
various categorization schemes also have trouble sorting the same set of ‘intermediate’ 
or hard to classify countries.” The purpose of this article is to tackle questions about 
classification of countries theoretically and empirically.
In this paper, we leverage recent advances in mixture model-based clustering (Fraley/
Raftery 1998, 2002; Raftery/Dean 2006) to see what the data say on the matter. By posit-
ing the data as a mixture of some to-be-estimated number of multivariate Gaussian 
densities, the mixture model approach gives cluster analysis a strong basis in probability 
theory. In so doing, model-based clustering has three notable advantages over tradi-
tional clustering methods. First and most importantly, the choice of clustering method 
now becomes a problem of model choice. We have strong guidance from well-under-
stood principles of likelihood theory in this regard. Second, the model-based approach 
identifies the number of clusters in the data. Other methods either require a priori as-
sumptions (e.g., k-means) or only describe how “far” various observations are from one 
another (agglomerative clustering). Third, model-based clustering can accommodate 
several cluster shapes; traditional methods are special cases of the more flexible cluster 
geometries available in the model-based approach.
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In the analysis, we identify the dimensions along which countries are purported to vary 
and collect time-series measures on each for 21 OECD countries, 1980–2005. We then 
examine these data for clusters both in the cross-section and over time. We find that 
the data parallel the experts’ arguments: There is considerable uncertainty around the 
number of clusters and, barring a few cases, over which country should be placed in 
which cluster. Moreover, when viewed over time, both the number of clusters and coun-
try membership change considerably. Therefore, we urge caution in using country clas-
sifications in empirical analysis.
We have two objectives in this paper. First, we hope to expand the use of mixture models 
in the social sciences by applying them to a substantive controversy. Second, our findings 
have several implications for the literature in comparative political economy. Specifically, 
arguments about who has the “right” typology are misplaced; these data do not exhibit 
sufficient structure for any time-invariant all-encompassing clustering to be empirically 
useful. Therefore discussions of LMEs or CMEs should be used as heuristics or Weberian 
ideal types only. These categories do not measure anything meaningful in the data ana-
lytic sense, especially in the context of time-series cross-section data, and should there-
fore not be employed as indicator variables. Finally, we argue that the real value of both 
Esping-Andersen’s work and the varieties of capitalism project persists in their theoreti-
cal contributions, which have been largely obscured by easy-to-remember typologies.
The paper proceeds in four parts. Section 1 briefly reviews the long tradition of classifi-
cation in comparative political economy (CPE), with an emphasis on the controversies 
and uses of the VoC and “three worlds” perspectives. Section 2 discusses mixture models 
and model-based clustering in more detail, with special attention to their relationships 
to other clustering and data reduction techniques commonly used in the social sciences. 
Section 3 explores the variables purported to define the VoC clusters and discusses the 
limits of our analysis. We conclude in Section 4 with observations on how best to em-
ploy the theoretical insights from the VoC project in empirical research, given our find-
ings from the cluster analysis.
1 Welfare regimes and institutional complementarities:  
Clustering in comparative political economy
Attempts to generate typologies of advanced democracies started in the late 1950s with 
the distinction between residual and institutional welfare states (Wilensky/Lebeaux 
1958). Literature on corporatism continued this proclivity for developing country 
typologies and made it a mainstay in political science (see Siaroff 1999 for a recent 
example).1 The most recent classifications, presented in Table 1, are the motivation for 
1 We thank Martin Höpner for pointing out this trajectory.
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our paper. The table lists the classification of 21 advanced democracies according to 
Esping-Andersen’s (1990) three worlds of welfare states, Kitschelt et al.’s (1999) insti-
tutional diversity of contemporary capitalism, and Hall and Soskice’s (2001) firm-cen-
tered classification of varieties of capitalism.
We do not intend to review the theoretical arguments surrounding the three worlds and 
VoC classifications, but there is a significant empirical implication worth describing. 
Broadly speaking, each of these attempts at clustering is driven by theoretical arguments 
positing self-reinforcing linkages across economic policies and institutions. Esping-An-
dersen refers to these linkages as “regimes” of welfare state effort and traces their emer-
gence to the form of cross-class coalitions emerging in the postwar period. Specifically, 
he focuses on the choice of the new middle class as determining the type of welfare state 
regime that later emerged. The VoC literature is based on the notion of “institutional 
complementarities” in which “the presence (or efficiency) of one [institution] increases 
the returns from (or efficiency of) the other” (Hall/Soskice 2001: 16). These institutional 
externalities reinforce (or undo) one another and generate distinct equilibrium clusters 
of institutional arrangements, corporate strategies, and social policies and outcomes. 
Both the historical arguments of Esping-Andersen and the strong notions of equilibrium 
in the VoC literature directly imply that clusters of countries should be time-invariant or, 
at the very least, should change very slowly. Much of the recent work in the VoC literature 
aims to discover how resilient these clusters are in the face of exogenous changes in the 
international economy (Campbell/Pedersen 2007; Culpepper 2005; Thatcher 2004).
Table 1 Twenty-one OECD economies and their categorizations
Country Country code Three worlds Types of capitalism Varieties of capitalism
Australia AUS Liberal LME LME
Canada CAN Liberal LME LME
Great Britain GBR Liberal LME LME
Japan JPN Liberal NC/C CME
Switzerland CHE Liberal SCME CME
United States USA Liberal LME LME
Austria AUT Conservative SCME CME
Belgium BEL Conservative SCME CME
Germany DEU Conservative SCME CME
France FRA Conservative SCME NC/C
Italy ITA Conservative SCME NC/C
Denmark DNK Soc. Dem. NCME CME
Finland FIN Soc. Dem. NCME CME
Netherlands NLD Soc. Dem. SCME CME
Norway NOR Soc. Dem. NCME CME
Sweden SWE Soc. Dem. NCME CME
Greece GRC NC/C NC/C NC/C
Ireland IRL NC/C LME LME
New Zealand NZL NC/C LME LME
Portugal PRT NC/C NC/C NC/C
Spain ESP NC/C NC/C NC/C
Note: The country codes are based on ISO 3166. The country classifications are: LME = Liberal Market Economy, 
CME = Coordinated Market Economy, NCME = National Coordinated Market Economy, SCME = Sectoral 
Coordinated Market Economy, NC/C = not categorized or controversial.
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Where do these clusters come from?
The inspiration for clustering in the comparative political economy literature springs 
from the stark differences in labor market organization, social spending, and firm struc-
ture across the relatively successful countries of Western Europe, North America and 
the Pacific basin. While Germany and the United States are frequently contrasted as 
archetypal cases for VoC, the major theoretical works emphasize that the typologies 
are meant to generate Weberian ideal types through which to evaluate actual cases, not 
specific empirical groupings. Hall and Soskice (2001: 8) state that “the core distinction 
we draw is between two types of political economies … which constitute ideal types at 
the poles of a spectrum along which many nations can be arrayed.” Nevertheless, these 
same works also attempt to empirically identify clusters and map them onto their ideal 
types. Many subsequent authors seem to have taken up the empirical clustering more 
than the theoretical arguments.
Before turning to some of the empirical applications of the VoC classification, let us 
briefly consider how the initial clusterings were generated. The typologies have emerged 
from two major sources: direct comparison of a set of countries along a limited number 
of dimensions and expert classifications. We focus on the former. Esping-Andersen con-
structed several additive indices of decommodification, corporatism, pensions, etc. for 
circa 1980 and then ranked countries using these indices. He finds that certain groups 
of countries tend to jointly rank highly on some indices and near the bottom on others. 
On this basis he argues for his three worlds. The earlier VoC works tend to rely on visual 
heuristic methods that are also frequently based on additive indices and specific time 
points. Figure 1, from Estévez-Abe, Iversen and Soskice (2001), is an example of a visual 
classification of countries according to the level of social protection and skill formation. 
We will return to these data and this plot below.
Subsequent authors have attempted to revise these classifications. Some have disputed 
the placement of certain countries, most notably the southern European economies 
of France, Spain, and Portugal, and argued for the inclusion of a “Latin” or “Mediter-
ranean” regime (e.g. Saint-Arnaud/Bernard 2003: 504). Others have proposed similar 
revisions (Amable 2003; Obinger/Wagschal 2001). Alternatively, a second dimension 
of classification has been proposed (Höpner 2007). Most directly related to our proj-
ect, several papers attempt to put the VoC classifications on more rigorous footing us-
ing data reduction techniques such as principal components analysis (Hicks/Kenwor-
thy 2003), latent factor analysis (Hall/Gingerich 2004), traditional clustering methods 
(Obinger/Wagschal 2001; Saint-Arnaud/Bernard 2003), or all three (Amable 2003). 
Schröder (2008) has even proposed integrating VoC and welfare regimes using cluster 
analysis. We discuss how our analysis extends these exercises in detail below.
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Empirical application of the VoC classification
The empirical applications of the VoC arguments have focused on either exploiting the 
VoC classification scheme, testing it, or, in at least one instance (Taylor 2006), exploiting 
the VoC classifications to argue against the VoC theoretical apparatus. VoC classifica-
tions have been employed empirically in both quantitative and qualitative analysis.
On the quantitative side, dummy variables representing cluster membership have been 
either directly included as regressors (Ringe 2006; Taylor 2006) or used to split the data-
set into parts and then test for the equality of coefficient estimates across models fit to 
data from CMEs and LMEs (Rueda/Pontusson 2000). All these analyses use time-series 
cross-section (TSCS) data and treat cluster membership as time-invariant. In this paper 
we do not attempt to show the extent to which these authors’ findings are sensitive to 
cluster allocation, but it is worth mentioning that Taylor (2006) shows that findings 
relating patent counts to VoC clusters are sensitive to the inclusion of the United States 
as an LME.
Note: This is figure 4.2 from Estévez-Abe/Iversen/Soskice (2001: 172).
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The VoC classification has, if anything, found its broadest application in qualitative 
work. Indeed, while the initial clustering of countries was shown heuristically in bivari-
ate scatterplots, the most extensive discussion of empirical differences in Hall and 
Soskice’s introduction was a comparison of the United States and Germany. Case stud-
ies have most frequently used the VoC classification to justify case selection. To take a 
few recent examples already mentioned above, Thatcher (2004) argues that his choice of 
cases for comparing telecommunications regulations (Germany, France, Italy, Great 
Britain) is driven by their positions in the VoC pantheon. Campbell and Pedersen (2007) 
use the VoC classifications to justify both the choice of case (Denmark) and dimensions 
of analysis (labor markets, vocational training, and industrial policy). The journal Gov-
ernance recently dedicated an entire issue to comparisons of economic crisis manage-
ment in Japan and Sweden. The introduction (Immergut/Kume 2006) specifically in-
vokes the VoC in justifying this emphasis.
2 Cluster analysis and the social sciences
Cluster analysis (and its close relative, discriminant analysis) is a well-developed branch 
of applied statistics that attempts to identify groups in data such that objects within 
groups are as similar as possible while the differences between groups are maximized. 
Cluster and discriminant analysis have found wide application across disciplines as di-
verse as botany, chemistry, computer science, genetics, geography, medicine, and zoolo-
gy. Within the social sciences, cluster analysis has appeared most frequently in sociology 
but has been less common in political science and economics. In this section we briefly 
introduce traditional cluster analysis and then go into a detailed discussion of the mix-
ture model-based clustering (MMBC) approach we employ below. We then contrast 
MMBC analysis to both traditional methods and other data-reduction techniques, as 
well as to latent-variable models such as principal components and factor analysis.
Hierarchical and relocation clustering methods
Throughout we will use the term “group” to refer to the true, existing groupings of 
objects and “cluster” to denote the collections of observations identified via some algo-
rithm or statistical model, i.e., a cluster is an estimated grouping. Cluster analysis has 
at least one of two objectives: identifying some sort of cluster structure in a set of ob-
servations and/or assigning observations to clusters in some optimal manner. Kaufman 
and Rousseeuw (1990) offer an accessible introduction to traditional cluster analysis. 
Relocation methods,2 k-means being the most well-known, require that the researcher 
2 Sometimes, they are confusingly referred to as partitioning methods.
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posit the number of clusters in the data a priori and then proceed to iteratively move 
observations between clusters until an optimal allocation can be identified. In hierar-
chical cluster analysis, the number of groups is unknown. Hierarchical cluster analysis 
uses intuitively plausible procedures based on various distance metrics to either merge 
or partition observations into clusters.
Hierarchical cluster analysis can take one of two forms. The “agglomerative” approach 
starts by regarding each object on its own and proceeds to combine them into clusters 
that maximize within-cluster similarity and between-cluster difference, as determined 
by a distance metric. Several different metrics can be employed here, and the literature 
provides little guidance about their appropriateness. The “divisive” approach proceeds 
in the opposite direction, beginning with all objects in one cluster and subdividing 
them until each object is on its own. Frequently these methods yield different solu-
tions.3 Presentation of hierarchical clustering results is most commonly done through 
dendrograms, where the length of line segments is directly interpretable as the dissimi-
larity between clusters. The longer the segment before two clusters combine into one, 
the more dissimilar the observations.
Hierarchical cluster analysis is primarily an exploratory rather than confirmatory or 
inferential activity. There are many attributes on which to measure similarity and dif-
ference across objects, and numerous algorithms for identifying clusters given some set 
of attributes. There is no statistical basis on which to prefer a particular clustering solu-
tion over another and no possibility of evaluating the uncertainty around a particular 
observation’s assignment to a given cluster. The choice of both the number of clusters to 
focus on and the substantive interpretations assigned to them is solely the responsibility 
of the researcher. Referring to the traditional clustering methods, Venables and Ripley 
(2002: 316) argue that “there are many different clustering methods, often giving differ-
ent answers, and so the danger of over-interpretation is high.”
The hierarchical approach has been applied at least twice to problems similar to the 
one we address below (Obinger/Wagschal 2001; Saint-Arnaud/Bernard 2003). Though 
these authors analyze somewhat different sets of data and use slightly different time 
frames, both conclude that there are four relevant clusters among advanced industrial 
nations, though the exact membership varies across studies and time. Figure 2 displays 
some results from both papers.
As can be seen from Figure 2, it is up to the researcher to identify, justify, and interpret 
a four-cluster solution. A two-, five-, or six-cluster solution seems just as plausible for 
both dendrograms in Figure 2. Traditional methods provide no principled way out of 
this problem.
3 The divisive approach is much less common, as its computational demands increase exponen-
tially in the number of observations (Venables/Ripley 2002).
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Mixture model-based clustering
Mixture models have a long tradition in statistics and have more recently been ap-
plied to the clustering problem by Fraley and Raftery (1998, 2002) and Raftery and 
Dean (2006). This second generation of clustering methods assumes that the observed 
data are generated by some finite mixture of probability distributions.
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(a) Obinger/Wagschal (2001: Fig. 3, p. 106).
(b) Saint-Arnaud/Bernard (2003: Fig. 4, p. 513).
Figure 2 Illustrative results from two studies relying on traditional hierarchical clustering
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Let x = x1…xn be the n × k matrix of n objects measured along k dimensions. The den-
sity of x can then be expressed as a finite mixture model of the form 
f fg
g
G
g( ) ( )x x=
=
åp
1
where G is the number of groups, πg is the proportion of objects in group g, and fg (∙) is 
the density function for observations in group g. We assume that all groups are defined 
by multivariate normal densities, yielding
f g
g
G
g( ) ( | )x x=
=
åp f q
1
where φ (∙|θ) is the multivariate normal density function with parameters θg = (µg, Σg). 
The model classifies an observation as being in group g if τg (x) > τh (x) ∀h ≠ g; h ∈1,…,G 
where
t
p f q
p f q
g
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h
h
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τg can be interpreted as the (posterior) probability that an observation belongs to group 
g. We can now express the full mixture likelihood:
 ( , , ; , , | ) ( | )q q t t t f q1 1
11
¼ ¼ =
==
åÕG G g
g
G
i
n
i gx x  (1)
It is clear from equation 1 that the number of parameters estimated grows rapidly with 
the number of clusters G and the number of dimensions k. Baneld and Raftery (1993) 
partially mitigate this problem by placing restrictions on the covariance matrices Σg. 
Covariance matrices are parameterized using eigenvalue decompositions of the form
 Sg g g g g
T=l D A D  (2) 
 
where λg is the largest eigenvalue of Σg, Dg is the orthogonal matrix of eigenvectors, and 
Ag is a diagonal matrix of scaled eigenvalues. The parameters θg determine the geometry 
of the clusters. Specifically, clusters are ellipsoids centered at the mean vector. The de-
composition of Σg determines other geometric features of the clusters: λg determines 
the cluster’s volume; Dg controls the orientation of the cluster; and Ag governs the shape 
of the ellipsoid. MMBC admits a wide variety of cluster geometries.
We can modify the complexity of the models estimated by restricting the various com-
ponents of the matrix product on the RHS of equation 2 to be constant across clusters. 
The most restricted version, Σg = λI, constrains clusters to be spherical and of equal 
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volume.4 Table 2, reproduced from Fraley and Raftery (2007: 7), describes the various 
cluster geometries generated as restrictions on the covariance matrices are relaxed.
In fitting the model, the actual cluster to which observation i belongs is treated as miss-
ing data. The “complete data” xi can be expressed as xi = (yi, zi) where yi are the ob-
served data on which we seek to fit the clustering model and zi is a G-vector, the gth 
element of which takes on 1 if i belongs to cluster g and 0 otherwise. Assuming that zi  
~multinom(τ1…τG ), the resulting complete data likelihood is given by 
 c g g i g
z
g
G
i
n
ig=
==
ÕÕ [ [( | )]]t f qy
11
 (3)
(3) is maximized via EM (Dempster/Laird/Rubin 1977). For the M-step, (3) is maxi-
mized wrt (τ1,…τG; θ1…θG), holding z at z~  . Given estimates (~τ   g ,  
~
 θ g ), z~  g is given from the 
E-step:
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For the multivariate normal mixtures used here, Fraley and Raftery (2002) give closed 
form solutions for ~τ   g  and  ~μ  g : ~τ   g  = ng/n, where ng = Σ
n
i  =1 z
~ ig, and 
~μ  g = (Σ
n
i  =1 z
~ ig yi )/ng.
Model choice and MMBC
The challenge of MMBC is to select both the number of clusters and the parameteriza-
tions of the covariance matrix. Since each combination of these choices represents a 
(non-nested) statistical model, MMBC recasts the clustering problem as one of model 
selection. We have strong guidance from statistical theory in this regard: Non-nested 
4 Note that this is equivalent to the sum-of-squares distance measure most frequently employed 
in hierarchical clustering (Ward 1963).
Table 2 Cluster geometries generated by differing parameterizations of the covariance 
matrices Σg
Model Distribution Volume Shape Orientation
λI   Spherical Equal Equal NA
λgl Spherical Variable Equal NA
λA Diagonal Equal Equal Along the axes
λgA Diagonal Variable Equal Along the axes
λAg Diagonal Equal Variable Along the axes
λgAg Diagonal Variable Variable Along the axes
λDADT Ellipsoidal Equal Equal Equal
λDgADTg Ellipsoidal Equal Equal Variable
λgDgADTg Ellipsoidal Variable Equal Variable
λgDgAgDTg Ellipsoidal Variable Variable Variable
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models can be compared using approximate Bayes factors (Kass/Raftery 1995).5 Bayes 
factors are frequently difficult to integrate so we use the Bayesian information criterion 
(BIC) approximation 
BIC = –2log(x, θ   ) + m log n
where  θ    is the maximum likelihood estimate of θ and m is the number of free param-
eters in the model. In comparing models, we choose the parameterization(s) that maxi-
mize the BIC. Conventionally, two models with a BIC difference less than two are dif-
ficult to distinguish, whereas a difference of ten or greater constitutes strong evidence 
for favoring one model over another (Kass/Raftery 1995).
Variable selection and MMBC
Any collection of objects can be measured and classified according to a large number 
of attributes (or dimensions). This is especially true when looking at complex entities, 
such as nations, over time. Intuitively, one can imagine that as the number of dimen-
sions approaches the number of objects to be classified there must be increasingly tight 
clustering to discern any pattern in the data.6 Technically, as the number of dimensions 
increases so does the number of parameters to estimate for θ, imposing constraints on 
the effective number of dimensions we can consider.7 In our application, we have a 
maximum of 21 cases for any point in time. Even restricting attention to “just” the stan-
dard variables of comparative political economy (industrial and labor market structure, 
social policy, and political-economic institutions) we still have to consider literally doz-
ens of potential attributes and several different measures for each attribute. It is simply 
not feasible to simultaneously consider all the plausible or proposed variables when 
determining the varieties of capitalism.
It is worth noting that this problem is implicit in the major works classifying countries. 
Esping-Andersen relies on a small number of constructed indices to identify his “three 
worlds.” The VoC literature rarely considers more than two particular attributes at a 
time. Some authors have resorted to data reduction techniques: Hicks and Kenworthy 
(2003) rely on principal components to reduce the dimensionality of the data in order 
5 The Bayes factor is the posterior odds for one model compared to another under the assump-
tion that there is no prior reason to favor one over another. Formally, let M1 and M2 be two 
competing models and y be the data. The Bayes factor is given by 
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6 As a simple example, consider two points on a page. On what basis can we say there is one clus-
ter or two?
7 How quickly this constraint prevents EM convergence clearly depends on the restrictions im-
posed on Σg. Agglomerative methods suffer from the same problem; it is merely less transparent 
here, since there is no underlying statistical parameterization to consider.
16 MPIfG Discussion Paper 09 /5
to classify different modes of welfare capitalism. Hall and Ginderich (2004) perform 
factor analysis on a cross-section of data and interpret the first factor extracted as repre-
senting the CME-LME division. Amable (2003) goes even further, conducting agglom-
erative analysis on the first three principal components.
Traditional data reduction techniques and cluster analysis do not easily go together. 
Chang (1983) proves that clustering information is not monotonically related to the 
eigenvalues of the principal components. There is no reason to believe that principal 
components with the largest eigenvalues are those retaining the greatest amount of 
clustering information. Reducing the dimensionality of the data by selecting principal 
components with the largest eigenvalues and then performing a cluster analysis, wheth-
er mixture model, hierarchical or relocation clustering, is usually not justified.
The MMBC-model selection approach provides one way around this problem. Raftery 
and Dean (2006) extend the notion of BIC-based model selection to include variable 
selection. They develop an algorithm in which the data, Y, are partitioned into three 
sets: variables already selected for clustering (Y1), variables being considered for inclu-
sion or exclusion from Y1, denoted Y2, and all remaining variables (Y3). The algorithm 
is initialized by choosing the variable on which there is the most evidence of cluster-
ing. With each subsequent step, two models are considered.8 In the first step, Y2 gives 
no additional information on clustering conditional on Y1. In the second, Y2 does im-
prove clustering. At each step the models are compared and a variable is included or 
excluded based on its effect on the BIC, maximized over the number of clusters and 
model parameterizations.9 Moreover, the variable selection procedure provides a way 
in which to use dimension reduction techniques, such as principal components. The 
MMBC algorithm, applied to principal components, chooses the extracted component 
with the greatest amount of clustering information rather than the one that maximizes 
“explained” variance, as the eigenvalue criterion does.
To summarize the discussion on clustering and MMBC: To date, social scientists at-
tempting to classify rich democracies have employed methods best characterized as 
exploratory. We see unstable results and findings that hinge on the researchers’ inter-
pretations. These works implicitly avoid dimensionality problems by relying on addi-
tive indicators or data reduction techniques such as principal components analysis. In 
contrast, the MMBC and model selection approach improves previous efforts by (1) 
allowing for more flexible clustering geometries based on well-understood parametric 
distributions; (2) providing a principled way for selecting the optimal clustering solu-
tions by comparing non-nested models via the BIC; (3) generalizing the variable selec-
8 Formally, we are interested in models characterizing p(Y|z), where z defines cluster member-
ship. Model 1 factors this into p(Y3|Y2,Y1)p(Y2|Y1)p(Y1|z) whereas model 2 posits p(Y3|Y2,Y1)
p(Y2,Y1|z).
9 The maximum number of clusters must be set prior to analysis. For our application below we 
set this maximum to seven unless otherwise noted. See Raftery/Dean (2006: 176–177) for a 
detailed elaboration of the algorithm.
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tion problem to one of model selection, thereby providing guidance on which variables 
to use, be they single variables or principal components.
3 Three worlds, two varieties, and the data
In this section we use the MMBC approach to explore the data for clustering structure 
and compare our findings with assertions from both Esping-Andersen’s “three worlds” 
approach and the varieties of capitalism approach. Before turning to the data analysis, we 
outline our rationale for data selection. First, in order to keep the gap between theoretical 
concepts and operationalization as small as possible, we replicate data used in key stud-
ies. Second, we assemble a large batch of variables that previous works have identified as 
relevant for distinguishing countries. Specifically, we follow the theoretical development 
in the VoC literature. We start with the core dimensions of the VoC approach – the pro-
duction regime measures as identified in Hall and Gingerich (2004). From there, we fol-
low the literature on advanced capitalist democracies, including three areas. First, we in-
clude measures of welfare, because of the proposed link between production regime and 
welfare states (Iversen 2005; Mares 2001; Swenson 2002). A second strain of literature 
adds the importance of political institutions (Gourevitch/Shinn 2005; Iversen/Soskice 
2006; Iversen/Stephens 2008). Finally, recent efforts (Soskice 2007) link the production 
regime with macroeconomic policy.
We approach the analysis in steps.10 We begin by using MMBC to explore the clustering 
reported in Figure 1 (Estévez-Abe/Iversen/Soskice 2001: 172) and Hall and Gingerich 
(2004). Both these analyses are static and we use them to illustrate the value-added of 
the MMBC approach even when our findings are similar in flavor to the VoC clustering. 
We next describe the data we have gathered and then take a more dynamic perspec-
tive, employing MMBC and the variable selection algorithm to look at cross-sectional 
slices at different time periods. We then show that our non-finding of stable clustering 
solutions over time corresponding with either the VoC or “three worlds” approaches is 
robust for clustering on different subsets of variables. Rather than using the variable 
selection directly, we break the variables into institutional/policy domains and consider 
clustering within each of those. Finally, to put the temporal stability argument to an 
even stronger test, we randomly select a time slice for each country and examine these 
temporally mixed datasets using MMBC. Across all these analyses, we find little evi-
dence of clustering of the form described by literature on either “three worlds” or VoC.
A few words on the presentation and interpretation of results are in order. Our goal here 
is not to attempt to identify specific clusters and impose any interpretation on them; 
rather, we are concerned with determining the empirical robustness of typology devel-
10 All analysis was performed in R 2.6.1 (R Core Development Team, 2007) using the mclust, 
mclust02, and clustvarsel libraries (Fraley/Raftery 2002, 2007; Raftery/Dean 2006).
18 MPIfG Discussion Paper 09 /5
oped elsewhere. Wherever possible, we attempt to present results graphically in which 
clusters are identified by the density contours of the estimated cluster distribution. This 
has the advantage of visually displaying the uncertainty surrounding each point, but be-
comes impossible when clustering in more than two or three dimensions. In these cases 
we report tables of results. When evaluating clustering solutions, we frequently come 
upon situations in which the MMBC/model selection procedure identifies solutions 
with either only one cluster or more than six as the best-fitting model. We interpret 
either of these solutions as demonstrating the absence of any interpretable clustering 
structure in the data.
MMBC applied to pre-selected variables and indices
Clustering of welfare production regimes
Before turning to the dynamic analysis, we illustrate the MMBC approach on two static 
datasets. In this section, we apply MMBC to variables already identified as defining 
welfare production regimes. The data are those reported in Estévez-Abe, Iversen and 
Soskice (2001), Iversen (2005: ch. 2), and summarized in Figure 1. As a first step, we 
apply the variable selection algorithm to their original six variables: three variables on 
employment protection and three on unemployment protection, using collective dis-
Table 3 Clusters of welfare production regimes
Country Cluster Uncertainty
CAN 1 0.00
FIN 1 0.00
FRA 1 0.00
NOR 1 0.00
SWE 1 0.00
AUT 2 0.00
BEL 2 0.00
CHE 2 0.00
DEU 2 0.00
DNK 2 0.00
NLD 2 0.00
IRL 3 0.01
JPN 3 0.00
NZL 3 0.00
AUS 4 0.00
GBR 4 0.00
ITA 4 0.00
USA 4 0.00
No. of clusters 4
Variance decomposition EEE
BIC –429
Note: Entries of the same color are classified in the same 
VoC category. Blue entries are LMEs, black are CMEs, and 
red entries are not classified or otherwise controversial.
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missal protection as the sole employment protection measure selected. All three unem-
ployment measures – net unemployment replacement rates, generosity of benefits, and 
definition of suitable jobs – have been used in the cluster analysis.11 Table 3 displays the 
resulting country clusters. The BIC-maximizing MMBC algorithm chooses an ellipsoi-
dal model with equal volume, shape, and orientation. It also identifies four clusters (and 
not two as with the VoC approach, or five as Figure 1 illustrates). Moreover, the country 
classifications do not mirror those of Iversen.
As an alternative to the heuristic classification from Figure1, we run the MMBC algo-
rithm on the first principal component for unemployment protection and for employ-
ment protection.12 The resulting clusters and their probability densities are displayed in 
11 Interestingly, if all six of the original six measures are used in the cluster analysis, no clustering 
can be distinguished. We attribute this to the fact that we are estimating a model where k = 6 
using only 21 cases.
12 Each of these principal components represents 60 and 69 percent of the variance for employ-
ment and unemployment protection, respectively.
Figure 3 Clusters of employment and unemployment protection
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Figure 3. While this analysis recovers the same major clusters as the visual method used 
in Iversen (2005) and Estévez-Abe, Iversen and Soskice (2001), some additional features 
are apparent. First, MMBC identifies five, not two, as the optimal number of clusters. 
Second, the probability densities provide us with an assessment about how certain one 
is about the country clusters. While Australia and New Zealand are close to the peak of 
the densities and thus represent the core of the “occupational/general skill” profile, we 
are less certain about the placement of the Netherlands, Sweden, or even Austria and 
Germany in one particular cluster. Belgium, the Netherlands, and Sweden are assigned 
to different mini-clusters than what others researchers have identified. Third, the el-
lipsoidal clusters that MMBC identifies are not possible under traditional clustering 
methods that are restricted to spherical cluster geometries.
Institutional complementarities in the macro-economy
In order to capture the theoretical core of the VoC argument, we now rely on the six in-
dicators suggested by Hall and Gingerich (2004) to measure the institutional variation 
in corporate governance and in labor relations. We attempt to employ the same data as 
their study. This reduces the time period to one observation per country for 1990–1995 
and, due to missingness on various indicators, fourteen countries (see Hall/Gingerich 
[2004: 11] for their data and sources). We concentrate on the MMBC analysis of the 
principal components (PCs) for the corporate governance and labor relations dimen-
sions.13 The variable selection procedure chooses the first and third PC of corporate 
governance and the first PC of labor relations for the analysis. They explain about 65 
and 66 percent of the total variance, respectively. Note that the third PC provides more 
13 MMBC on the original six variables generates clusters highly dependent on G, the upper bound 
for the number of clusters considered in model selection.
Table 4 Clusters of corporate governance and  
 labor relations
Country Cluster Uncertainty
AUS 1 0.00
CAN 1 0.00
ESP 1 0.00
AUT 2 0.00
BEL 3 0.00
ITA 3 0.00
GBR 4 0.00
USA 4 0.00
DNK 5 0.00
FIN 6 0.00
FRA 6 0.00
SWE 6 0.00
DEU 7 0.00
PRT 7 0.00
No. of clusters 7
Variance decomposition EEE
BIC –40
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clustering information than the second one in this case. As Table 4 shows, the MMBC 
produces a classification of seven clusters. This result should be interpreted as a lack of 
structure in the data and indicates that countries cannot be grouped into LMEs and 
CMEs based on the operationalization of corporate governance and labor relations as 
employed by Hall and Gingerich (2004). In short, even for the core dimensions of pro-
duction regimes, it is not possible to distinguish countries based on the quantitative 
indicators employed in the literature.
Data
For our dynamic analysis, we look to the extant literature on comparative capitalism 
to identify the variables purported to define the “three worlds” or VoC approaches. As 
mentioned above, there is an enormous number of dimensions along which countries 
vary, and several plausible measures for each dimension. Additionally, as the com-
parative capitalism literature has grown, numerous idiosyncratic indices and coding 
schemes have emerged. As we are concerned with what the underlying data can tell us 
about clusters, we avoid constructed indices and, whenever possible, variables derived 
from expert coding. Since we are interested in both the classification of controversial 
cases and the assessment of the stability of clusters over time, we privilege the measures 
that provide some sort of time series and that maximize cross-sectional coverage.
It is clearly debatable what the proper indicators of welfare regimes and VoC are and 
whether some indicators represent constitutive features of a system or outcome vari-
ables. We sidestep this theoretical discussion here and simply assume that previous re-
search efforts have correctly identified some valid measurements of the two concepts. In 
our initial variable selection, we therefore rely only on measures that have been identi-
fied by the initial theoretical literature, as well as the subsequent attempts to empirically 
identify country grouping as discussed above. In short, we rely on the previous judg-
ment of scholarly work when identifying variables characterizing welfare production 
regimes and VoC. The model selection step in our MMBC algorithm then identifies 
those variables providing the most clustering information.
We are concerned with the actions of governments and economic actors, so we focus 
on political-economic institutional, policy, and structure variables. In addition, the fo-
cus on time-series cross-sectional data and our reluctance to assume time-invariance 
of quantitative indicators obviously results in the omission of some variables that are 
claimed to be theoretically important. Among them are cross-shareholding measures, 
skill specificity, firm-bank relations, and inter-firm relations (e.g. measures of the den-
sity of supply chains).
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Missing data and our initial variable selection
Table 9 in the appendix presents the variables we have identified from the VoC and “three 
worlds” literature. Our data are characterized by a high degree of missingness, confound-
ing the already thorny problem of classifying a relatively small number of countries ex-
isting in a high-dimensional space. To get the most out of our analysis, we use multiple 
imputation techniques to generate ten complete datasets.14 We then break the data into 
three disjoint time slices: 1980–84, 1990–94, and 2000–03. We break the data up in this 
way for three reasons: first, focusing on fairly restricted time slices is consonant with the 
strong notions of equilibrium institutions and complementarity that underlie both the 
“three worlds” and VoC approaches. Second, these windows are short enough to provide 
a snapshot but long enough to allow for some smoothing within the window. Finally, we 
allow for some time between slices, since institutions are purported to change slowly, if 
at all. Within each slice we take country averages for each variable. We therefore have 30 
smaller datasets with 21 observations in each. We denote by dm,t the imputed data subset 
from imputation m = 1,…,10 at time slice t = {early, middle, late}.
There is currently no method to propagate the measurement uncertainty represented 
by the cross-imputation variation into a mixture model and model selection algorithm. 
We attempt to make preliminary statements on clusters while also incorporating as 
much of the imputation-based uncertainty as possible. We recognize that our solution 
is suboptimal and discuss in the conclusion some ways in which future research might 
proceed in addressing this problem.
Specifically, we proceeded as follows: First, we conducted several exploratory variable-
selection experiments across different dm,t to gather some idea as to what the most com-
monly selected clustering variables are. We then attempted to select from among these 
variables a subset that had the lowest cross-imputation variation (relative to their means) 
and at the same time represented the major concepts from the VoC literature. The vari-
ables selected here were percent of labor force with tertiary education, social security 
spending as %GDP, social insurance spending as %GDP, unemployment benefit generos-
ity, pension generosity, unemployment replacement rate, restrictiveness of employment 
protection legislation, level of collective dismissal protection, proportion of those age 25 
and over with post-secondary education, benefit replacement rate, benefit duration, the 
tax wedge, total R&D personnel per 1,000 people, and patents awarded per 1,000 people. 
We then took these variables and performed the variable selection exercise across all the 
dm,t .
From the variable selection procedure, the following variables were selected most fre-
quently (listed here in descending order of the frequency selected): social insurance 
spending as %GDP, post-secondary educational attainment, number of patents awarded 
14 We used the R implementation of the Amelia software (Honaker/Blackwell/King 2006) for im-
putation.
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Figure 4 Clustering in two dimensions using the two most frequently selected variables across 
time and imputations. The cluster assignments vary over time and do not coincide 
with the VoC classications.
  Note: Countries with the same color text are classified into the same VoC groups.
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per 1000 people, total R&D personnel per 1000 people, and pension generosity. The anal-
ysis presented below is the result of clustering performed on three datasets (one for each 
time slice), each of which is composed of the mean values across all imputed datasets for 
that time slice. While we recognize that this throws away important information about 
the variability of these estimates, there is no readily available better method by which to 
proceed: Limiting our analysis to only the variables or countries for which complete data 
are available is not a preferable solution, especially when there are so few cases available.
Clustering with variable selection
Here we present four cluster analyses in which we gradually alter the variables under 
consideration. We begin with two baseline analyses. In the first, we use only the two 
most commonly identified variables in the cross-imputation investigation described in 
the previous section: social insurance spending as %GDP and post-secondary educa-
tional attainment. In the second, we include the two variables mentioned and add to 
these patents, workers employed in basic R&D as proportion of the workforce, and pen-
sion generosity. Again, these variables are selected because they provide “more informa-
tion” on country clusters and not because they are especially pertinent theoretically.
When clustering in only two dimensions, results are most easily viewed graphically. 
Figure 4 depicts contour plots describing the results across the three time periods. Text 
in the same color corresponds to the same VoC category.
Several things are immediately apparent. First, the number of clusters and the clustering 
solutions do not correspond to either the VoC or “three worlds” perspectives. While the 
United States, Canada, and New Zealand (LMEs all) are consistently grouped together, 
Great Britain and Ireland, also purported to be unambiguous LMEs, are at the core of 
the larger cluster that includes continental European economies for the early period. 
Australia and Japan are ambiguously classified and move between groups over the time 
periods. As the contour lines indicate, the spread around the clusters is generally fairly 
small, but it is greater for the Canada-New Zealand-United States cluster and largest for 
the Australia-Japan mini-cluster.
We extend the analysis by including more variables. Visualization becomes more dif-
ficult in six dimensions, so we report the results in Table 5. These results are largely 
consistent with what we see in the two-variable case: Both the number of clusters and 
cluster membership change over time. The United States, Canada, and New Zealand 
continue to be grouped together, but Australia, Ireland, and Great Britain are lumped 
with other groups and change group affiliations.
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Clustering within major substantive areas
The objection could be raised that we have not considered enough variables or that 
several variables have been used to measure the same underlying concept. From the 
literature we can identify two broad types of variables that purport to define the variet-
ies of capitalism: labor market regulations and education/training. In the former we 
include average unemployment insurance replacement rate, level of collective dismissal 
protection, employment protection legislation, social benefit replacement rate, benefit 
duration, pension generosity, and the tax wedge. In the latter we include the percent of 
the labor force with tertiary education, proportion of the population over 25 with post-
secondary education, number of patents awarded per 1,000 people, total R&D person-
nel per 1,000 people, and average years of schooling.
Employing the data from both groups, we utilize the variable selection algorithm with 
G ranging from 2 to 10. Recall that G is the maximum number of groups that the model 
selection algorithm considers when comparing competing models. As Table 6 indicates, 
training variables appear to provide more clustering information than labor market 
indicators. The number of patents per 1,000 people in the labor force, as well as the 
proportion of people with post-secondary education, are especially useful in clustering 
Table 5 Clustering results over time on the mean values of five variables 
 from ten imputed data sets
Country 1980–1984 1990–1994 2000–2003
AUS 1 1 1
CAN 1 4 2
NZL 1 4 2
USA 1 4 2
ESP 2 2 1
GRC 2 2 1
ITA 2 2 1
PRT 2 2 1
AUT 3 2 1
BEL 3 3 1
CHE 3 3 1
DEU 3 3 1
DNK 3 3 1
NLD 3 3 1
SWE 3 3 1
FIN 4 3 1
FRA 4 3 1
GBR 4 2 1
IRL 4 2 1
JPN 4 1 1
NOR 4 3 1
No. of clusters 4 4 2
Variance decomposition EEE EEE EEE
BIC –285 –270 –249
Note: The number of clusters maximizing the BIC varies over time as 
does membership within clusters. The cluster results do not coincide with 
expert classifications.
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countries. Among the labor market institutions, the benefit duration and replacement 
rates are helpful for identifying clusters. Below we reveal how the cluster results turned 
out, based on these variables. 
The following MMBC demonstrates how fragile the classification process within policy 
domains truly is. We employ the variables chosen by the selection algorithm for each time 
slice and conduct the MMBC using different values of G ranging from 2 (the theoretically 
proposed number of clusters) to 10. In Figure 5 we illustrate the results. For the early pe-
riod, a two-cluster solution dominates. Yet as the number of maximum allowed clusters 
increases, the country classifications change. For the middle period, a three-cluster solu-
tion is dominant. Clustering in the most recent period is noisy. Here up to nine clusters 
are proposed, and sensible clustering therefore becomes impossible. There are two more 
features worth noting. First, when we force the MMBC to consider solutions with a maxi-
mum of two or three clusters, it yields that number. Second and more importantly, not 
a single pair of countries is clustered together throughout the three time periods and the 
various values for G. In short, Figure 5 shows that countries cannot be classified based on 
quantitative indicators of skills/training and labor relations over time.
What if we privilege the VoC classification by constraining the maximum number of 
clusters and pre-selecting some important variables? We set the maximum number of 
clusters to seven. Variable selection identifies three variables (unemployment replace-
ment rate for a single worker, patents, and average years of schooling) for at least two 
periods.15 We present results from MMBC using those three variables in Table 7. Coun-
try clusters once again vary over time, so that even in this very restricted case, classifica-
tion is not consistent.
15 When all selected variables of each time period are employed, the MMBC cannot distinguish 
between countries.
Table 6 Selection of variables across labor market and skills/training variables
Variable No. of times selected bythe algorithm  
 (maximum times possible = 30)
Patents 16
Post-secondary eduction 13
Average years of school 12
Benefits duration 10
R&D personnel 10
Unemployment replacement 10
Tertiary education 8
Tax wedge 8
Unemployment generosity 8
Benefit replacement rate 7
Dismissal protection 2
Employment protection 2
Pension generosity 2
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As a last attempt, when each institutional domain is examined independently, average un-
employment insurance replacement rate and the percent of the labor force with tertiary 
education appear to provide the most clustering information across all time slices. When 
using only these two variables, the observations indeed split into two clusters for each 
time period, as reported in Figure 6. In this two-cluster result, the United States, Canada, 
and New Zealand cluster together, while Australia moves into the CME category.
Maximum G
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Figure 5 Cluster results on training and labor institutions, based on the selection of G, for each 
time slice
Note: Each color represents a cluster number, so that similarly colored observations cluster 
together. If the countries were ordered in the same two clusters over time, the graphs would 
show a red-orange stripe.
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Clustering with sampled country-years
As noted above, the VoC literature relies on a strong notion of equilibrium; the so-called 
institutional complementarities imply that the VoC classification should be time-invari-
ant, or at least should change very slowly. Indeed, the major theoretical criticism of the 
VoC project has been its inability to provide insight into institutional dynamics (Crouch 
2005; Deeg/Jackson 2007; Schmidt 2008).16 As a final examination of VoC clustering, we 
propose a harder test of the strong equilibrium assertions found in the VoC approach. 
We interpret VoC’s institutional stability assertion to imply empirically that country ob-
servations should be exchangeable across time periods for the purposes of clustering. 
Specifically, we construct 1,000 datasets in which each country observation is randomly 
sampled from one of the imputed datasets and one of the three time slices within that 
dataset. If VoC-style clustering is present in the variables we examine, this should have 
little appreciable influence on the clustering. This is not what we find. While two is the 
modal number of identified clusters, this only occurs 35 percent of the time. Across the 
1,000 datasets and using the same variables employed in the analysis reported in Table 5, 
over one-third of the data sets yielded clustering solutions of either only one cluster or 
six or more. We interpret these values to mean that there is no way to discern a cluster 
pattern in the data. Figure 7 provides the distribution of clustering solutions in these 
sampled data.
16 However, Hall’s recent work (Hall 2007 and Hall/Thelen 2009) responds to this criticism and 
outlines a more dynamic understanding.
Table 7 Country clustering according to three key features of the   
 labor market and skills/training regime
Country 1980–1984 1990–1994 2000–2003
AUS 1 1 1
CAN 1 1 1
DNK 1 1 1
IRL 1 1 2
NOR 1 1 1
NZL 1 1 2
SWE 1 1 1
USA 1 1 1
AUT 2 1 1
BEL 2 1 1
CHE 2 1 1
DEU 2 1 1
ESP 2 1 2
FIN 2 1 1
FRA 2 1 1
GBR 2 1 2
GRC 2 1 2
JPN 2 1 1
NLD 2 1 1
ITA 3 1 2
PRT 3 1 2
No. of clusters 3 1 2
Variance decomposition EEE XXI VII
BIC –0.32 13.76 15.27
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Two further methodological considerations
Multivariate normality
One important caveat is in order: We have not yet examined the multivariate normality 
assumption of the mixture models. Given the flexibility of the parameterizations con-
sidered, this is unlikely to cause major problems. Nevertheless, a possible robustness test 
would be to use a common transformation (log, root, standardization) and compare. Al-
ternatively, one might use univariate or multivariate tests for normality (Aitchison 1986). 
If the data fail to conform to our distributional assumptions, transformation may be 
necessary. This awareness also leads to possible extensions for multivariate discrete data.
Multiple imputation and MMBC
One of the major limitations of this analysis is an inability to fully account for the 
uncertainty across imputed datasets. We believe that we have been able to partly ad-
dress this uncertainty in variable selection, albeit in an ad hoc manner, by systemati-
cally comparing the selected variables across imputations. Our inability to address this 
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uncertainty is more pronounced in the MMBC/model selection results from datasets of 
cross-imputation means, though we do not believe that incorporating imputation un-
certainty would change our major conclusions about the overall lack of stable clustering 
coinciding with the VoC approach. We briefly speculate about two ways in which future 
research might proceed in order to develop methods to account for this uncertainty.
Suppose we have a dataset with N observational units over K dimensions with some 
observations missing at random. Let Q be the q × N × K array of q imputed datasets. In 
each dimension k ∈ {1,…, K} we therefore have q observations for each unit i ∈ {1,…, N}. 
Denote by qki   the vector of values for unit i along dimension k. The elements of qki  , 
under mild conditions, follow a t distribution with parameters (ξk, σ2k  ) (Little/Rubin 
2002). We can recover unbiased estimates ξ k and σ  2k   from the mean and variance of qki  . 
This suggests that one way to proceed is to view the imputation-clustering problem as 
a hierarchical model, in which each observation is multivariate-t with parameters esti-
mated from the imputation results. From these distributions we can then sample data 
points and estimate the mixture model generated. Important assumptions will have to 
be made about the covariance structure for the ξk .
An alternative though possibly complementary way of proceeding might relax the no-
tion that there exists a unique point measurement for unit i on dimension k. Rather 
we can consider each observational unit as defined by a region in k-dimensional space, 
specifically by the convex hull of the data Qi where Qi is a q × k matrix of values for unit 
i. We might then use the centroids of these N regions as observations on which to esti-
mate mixture-model results and then characterize the proportion of the density from 
cluster g that falls within the region defined for unit i. In this way we could compare the 
relative probabilities of region i coming from cluster g or h. Neither of these solutions is 
likely to be computationally trivial and will certainly be difficult to implement in situa-
tions with only 21 observational units, as we have here.
4 Discussion and conclusion
In the analysis presented above, we have attempted to investigate the clustering pattern 
among 21 OECD democracies across three time periods using variables identified in the 
literature as important for defining VoC clusters. We find that both the clusters identi-
fied and their stability do not coincide with the expectations from the literature. Indeed, 
stable country clusters are not prevalent in the two replication datasets presented in 
Section 3 as well as in the large cumulative data set (Section 4).
The rationale for the two replication exercises was a desire to keep theoretical concepts 
and operationalization as close as possible. We employed a large number of variables 
generally identified in the literature in order to (1) incorporate additional functional 
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attributes of both theories; (2) identify variables that provide “clustering information” 
via a model selection procedure; and (3) assess the equilibrium notion of the welfare 
regime and VoC theories. By relying on both strategies, we strived to achieve a close 
match between theory and operationalization and to identify the variables that provide 
the most information on clustering. A caveat regarding the cumulative dataset and the 
reliance on model-based clustering might be that the distance between some of the 
employed variables and the theoretical core of the welfare state regimes and VoC ap-
proaches would become too great. Neither strategy, however, turned out to be successful 
in producing stable country clusters conforming to VoC expectations.
While the results of our analysis are problematic for the strong notions of institutional 
complementarity and stickiness in the VoC literature, we do not claim to have “dis-
proved” the varieties of capitalism project or to have uncovered the definitive clustering 
solution in the data; far from it. Instead, we have three goals: first, and most directly 
relevant to researchers, our results show that these data are not sufficiently structured to 
productively employ these heuristic typologies as indicator variables in the regression 
analysis that is the bread and butter of empirical political economy. Using these catego-
ries in TSCS analysis, where they most frequently appear, is even more problematic, as 
the cluster patterns identified vary significantly across time. We also hope to have clari-
fied the relationship between the theoretical notions defining clusters and our ability to 
discern these clusters in noisy data. In so doing, we hope to prevent researchers from 
engaging in the circular reasoning implied by using typology-derived indicators to “ex-
plain” other variables previously used in defining the original typologies.
The second contribution of this article is in applying model-based clustering and vari-
able selection to clarify a substantive debate in comparative political economy. By start-
ing with the assumption that the data are the result of a mixture of multivariate Gauss-
ian densities, we are able to ground cluster analysis within probability theory. With 
the help of approximate Bayes factors and a suitable search algorithm, we are able to 
provide better estimates in the number of clusters, their shape, and their composition 
than have been achieved using previous methods.
On the theoretical level, our findings reinforce the fact emphasized in the major VoC 
works: The CME-LME division is meant to characterize two ideal-typical cases that 
may help us understand real-world political economies. The extent to which these con-
structs can help will depend on the ability of researchers to identify specific institutional 
linkages and the important agents acting within them. From there we can more con-
structively evaluate the existence and importance of “institutional complementarities” 
in explaining apparently robust differences in political economic structure and out-
comes among rich democracies. This exercise has been most fruitful to date in the fields 
of monetary policy and wage-price bargaining (Franzese 2001; Iversen 1999), and the 
insights drawn from there are now being extended into discussions of skills and skill 
acquisition in different labor markets (Mares 2003; Thelen 2004). We hope to reorient 
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the VoC literature away from simple typologies and toward a focus on the theoretical 
arguments that underpin the discussion of the CME-LME division.
Similarly, Esping-Andersen is now most well-known for his assertion of the “three 
worlds,” not for the historical arguments based on class interests and the emergence of 
differing party systems that he used to generate his typology. We hope that this paper 
will serve to rejuvenate research into the underlying theoretical argument he presented 
rather than to serve further borrowing of his typology. Important work in this area is 
already emerging (Cusak/Iversen/Soskice 2007; Iversen/Soskice 2001, 2005).
In conclusion, this paper broadens the appeal of mixture-model clustering tools in the 
social sciences by applying them to the substantive problem of clustering among rich 
democracies. Specifically, we have empirically examined the existence and stability of 
Esping-Andersen’s “three worlds” approach and the varieties of capitalism clusters of 
coordinated and liberal market economies. We find that the clusters of countries as-
serted to exist in the literature are not robust in the face of mixture-model tools and 
are not stable over time. As a result, we recommend that researchers do not use cluster 
membership as indicator variables in regressions, particularly with time-series cross-
section data. We also caution qualitative researchers in their use of the CME/LME cat-
egories for case selection and other research design decisions. Rather than emphasiz-
ing easy-to-remember typologies and empirical clusters, we hope comparative political 
economists of all methodological persuasions will sharpen their focus on the theoreti-
cal arguments about strong complementary relationships between certain institutions, 
policies, and organizational structures. Outside of the wage-price bargaining literature, 
these linkages are under-specified, under-formalized, and in need of much improved 
cross-national measurement.
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